COMMENT
THE BETTER PART OF
VALOUR-APPLICABILITY OF THE JONES
ACT TO THE FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
FLEET
I.

FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE-A BACKDROP

In the late 1930's, the United States was faced with a serious
problem created by the outbreak of war in Europe. Clearly she
wanted to avoid involvement, and to this end, she passed a series
of neutrality acts.1 However, passage of these acts left a large and
active United States merchant fleet unable to continue its
profitable trade with the allied powers. As a result, it became
common for American merchants, with tacit government
approval, to register their vessels in neutral Panama. Flying the
Panamanian ensign, they were then able to trade freely with the
allies. The quest for neutral flags was understandably intensified
with America's entry into the war in 1941.2
The political need for this"subterfuge ended with the war, but
the practice did not stop. Rather, it has grown markedly.3 The
shipowners discovered that by maintaining their fleets under
foreign registry, they could escape stringent United States tax,
labor, and safety regulations. So economical is the device that it
has been estimated that a shipowner can save as much as $100,000
a month per tanker by avoiding American labor law alone.'
Panama, Liberia and Honduras5 in particular, because of
their relative lack of such' regulations, have been doing a brisk
business in ship registration for 25 years. Although by no means
traditional maritime powers, they nonetheless have secured the
bulk of the world shipping fleet.
A typical fact pattern is as follows: A vessel is owned and
registered in Liberia by a Liberian corporation.6 The Liberian
1. Note, Panlibhon Registration of American-Owned Merchant Ships: Government
Policy and the Problem of the Courts,60 COLIM. L. Rav. 711 n. 1 (1960).
2. Id.
3. Id.

4. Id. at 715 n.39 notes that general operating costs for the flags of convenience fleet
are about half those of American flag vessels. The wages are only a quarter of American
wages.

5. Known as the Panlibhon countries.
6. Generally, local law requires that ships registered in a nation must be owned by

citizens of the nation. The "dummy" Liberian corporation satisfies that requirement.
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corporation, with only a nominal office in Liberia, is wholly
owned by a Panamanian corporation, having only a nominal

office in Panama. 7 The Panamanian corporation is wholly owned
by a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
New York. The vessel is involved in shipping in and out of United

States ports, and has never been to Liberia.
The problem facing the courts as to the "flags of
convenience"" fleet is this: to what extent can the fleet be held

subject to United States law? The answer has never been clear.
The purpose of this comment will be to examine the extent to

which American courts have, may, and should apply the Jones
Act' to these ships.10
I.

Groves v. Universe Tankships, Inc.

For two reasons, the recent case of Groves v. Universe

Tankships, Inc." is an excellent one around which to center this
examination. First, it is the latest treatment of the issue. Second,

it represents the furthest the United States courts have gone in
applying the Jones Act to foreign registered vessels.
Groves involves a corporate pattern similar to that of the

above example. Defendant Universe was a Liberian corporation
with nominal offices there. It was wholly owned by Oceanic

Tankships, Inc., a Panamanian corporation with nominal offices
in Panama. Oceanic's stock was almost entirely owned by an
American citizen, W.K. Ludwig. Ludwig was also the majority
stockholder, president, and a director of National Bulk Carriers,
Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
7. Apparently, the only reason for the interjection of the Panamanian corporation is
an attempt to further cloud the beneficial ownership, which is American.
8. This is what American courts generally call it. The shipowners, claiming that this
is the only way they can compete in international commerce, use the phrase "flags of
necessity," while Great Britain more bitterly calls it "the runaway fleet."
9. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1965). The Jones Act was passed to afford "seamen" greater
protection against injury occurring in the course of employment. Its most noteable
provisions provide for a trial by jury as a matter of right (lacking in non-statutory
maritime law) and abolish the fellow-servant, contributory negligence, and assumption of
risk defenses.
10. This problem also arises in the areas of tax law and labor law. See generally
Baker, Flags of Refuge for the Shipping Industry-FederalIncome Tax Considerations,
13 TAX L. Rav. 137 (1958); Comment, Flags of Convenience and NLRB Jurisdiction,60
Nw.U.L. REv.(1965).
I1.Civil no. 64-2005 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 23, 1970).
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in New York. Universe was'entirely controlled and operated by
Ludwig through National Bulk, and the two corporations shared
the same offices and officers.
Decedent seaman was a British subject, and a resident of the
British West Indies. He joined the vessel in Trinidad, signing
Liberian articles which provided for the application of Liberian
law to any claims for injury or death.12 The ship flew a Liberian
flag but had never been in a Liberian port. 3 While in Japanese
waters, he died as a result of the alleged negligence of Universe.
Plaintiff, administratrix of decedent's estate, brought suit for
wrongful death.
Defendant moved to dismiss 4 the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In denying the
motion, the federal district court noted that the intricate
incorporation scheme was only "a.facade to avoid the
consequences of American ownership."'" Although the only nexus
between the cause of action and the United States was that the
vessel was beneficially owned and controlled by a United States
citizen, the court held that this alone was sufficient to allow
application of the Jones Act.
III.

Groves IN

THE CONTEXT OF

14

YEARS OF DECISIONAL LAW

The holding in Groves, that American ownership and control
is sufficient in itself to justify application of the Jones Act, is the
latest chapter in a fourteen year history of equivocal and
inconsistent rulings on that issue. The conflicting decisions result
from the broad general tests set out in two leading cases,
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 6 and Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships,

Inc.'7 Neither of these cases was concerned specifically with the
narrow issue of Groves and its predecessors. Rather, they
addressed themselves to the general problem of how to decide
whether the Jones Act applies to a vessel flying a foreign flag.
12. Liberia has adopted the non-statutory general maritime law of the United States
as its own. Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). The reason that plaintiff wants the Jones Act applied is that it, unlike general
maritime law, provides for a cause of action for wrongful death.
13. The court speculated that it is unlikely that she ever will be.
14. Pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 12 (b).
15. Civil no. 64-2005 (S.D.N.Y.) at 13.
16. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
17. 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959).
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Lauritzen laid t6e foundation for the entire field. On its facts,
it concerned a Danish seaman aboard a Danish owned and
registered vessel, who had signed Danish articles providing for
application of Danish law. He signed the articles while
temporarily in New York, and was injured in Havana, Cuba. The
court listed seven factors' s which must be considered in
determining jurisdiction: (1) The place of the wrongful act; (2) the
law of the flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
the allegiance of the defendant shipowner; 9 (5) the place of the
contract; (6) the accessibility of a foreign forum; and (7) the law
of the forum. 20 Of the seven, the law of the flag, and the
allegiances of the injured seaman and the shipowner were
considered most important. 2' Applicability of the Jones .Act was
to be determined by weighing the factors against each other, and
against the "national interest served by the assertion of
authority. ' 22 Applying the factors to the case, the Lauritzen court
readily determined that the Jones Act could not apply.
Following Lauritzen, is what has been described as an
"avalanche" of cases2 3 On examining them, one would think that
a mathematician had perfected and applied all the permutations
and combinations of facts possible under the seven factors. Of this
array between 1953 (Lauritzen) and 1959 (Bartholomew), there

are only four cases which bear directly on the issue of mere
ownership.
Argyros v. Polar Compania de Navegacion, Ltda. 24 in 1956,
and Mproumeriotis v. Seacrest Shipping Co.2 5 in 1957, held the
18. Called "the seven immortal pillars of Lauritzen" by the 5th circuit in Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1969).

19. Id. Hellenic provides an interesting twist to this particular factor. Note that the
injured seaman's allegiance or domicile is important, but when considering the shipowner,
Lauritzen is concerned only with his allegiance. Hellenic concerned a vessel owned by a
Greek citizen who was a permanent resident of the United States. Apparently rejecting
Lauritzen's limitation, the court ruled that defendant's permanent American residence was
a sufficient contact to apply the Jones Act. But see 44 TUL. L. Rv.347 (1970) which
curiously lauds Hellenic for its rejection of Bartholomew and return to Lauritzen's

analysis.
20. 345 U.S. at 583-91.
21. Separately discussing each factor, the court weighed them and virtually discounted
all but these three.

22. 345 U.S. at 582.
23. 44 TUL. L. Rav. 347 (1970).
24. 146 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
25. 149 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

Jones Act inapplicable. But the precedent was not followed. In
1958, in Rodriguez v. PolarShipping, Ltd.,2 a contrary result was
reached in the same district. The plaintiff in Rodriguez alleged
that an American citizen had both beneficial ownership and
control over the ship. The court noted Argyros and
Mproumeriotis but "distinguished" them on the grounds that the
pleadings in those cases indicated only ownership, not control.
Holding that the Jones Act applied, the court concluded that,
balanced upon Lauritzen's scales, ownership and control by
United States citizens was a sufficient contactY As a later court
points out, however, this distinction between ownership and
control is, as a practical matter in world shipping, one without a
difference? 8 It is a reasonable conclusion therefore, that Justice
Cashin's distinction in Rodriquez was born of diplomacy to his
brethren on the Argyros and Mproumeriotis courts. In reality, his
position was that the decisions were incorrect, and that bare
ownership (connoting control) by United States' interests is
enough to support Jones Act jurisdiction.
Rodriguez was followed the same year in Bobolakis v.
Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A.2Y But here,

instead of distinguishing Argyros and Mproumeriotis tactfully,
Judge Kaufman directly rejected them. He also took note of
Justice Cashin's ownership/control distinction, and while
approving of the result in Rodriquez, he expressly declined to pass
on the validity of the distinction. Even so, when he presented the
facts of his case, he quietly characterized the American owner's
interest in the vessel as "ownership and control."
In 1959 the second of the two leading cases in the area,
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc.30 was decided. As in

Lauritzen, the facts of the case are not helpful as to the specific
26. 169 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
27. As authority, the court cited Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, 113

F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Zielinski's facts provided the court two American contacts
with which to work. First, the vessel was beneficially owned and controlled by United
States citizens. Second, the injured seaman was a United States domicilliary. Rodriguez

interprets Zielinski's language as holding that American control was the paramount factor.
The domicile of the seaman was seen as immaterial to the decision. A careful reading of
Zielinski, however, does not support this conclusion.
28. Moutzouris v. National Shipping & Trading Co., 194 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y.

1961).
29. 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
30. 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959).
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issue of bare ownership. In contrast to Lauritzen however, the
American contacts in Bartholomew were notable for their
overwhelming substantiality. The case involved an American
beneficial owner, and an assault in United .States waters upon an
American domicilliary who had signed a declaration of intention
to naturalize.
In Bartholomew, the second circuit took the opportunity to
reevaluate the test for Jones Act jurisdiction established by
Lauritzen. Finding the balancing of contacts test difficult to apply
absent a specific guide as to the relative weights of the contacts,
the court announced a new, unilateral test. Without looking to the
foreign interests involved, Judge Medina directed that courts
should only determine whether the American contacts are
"substantial," that is "something between minimal and
preponderant ... "I'
Even though the contacts in Bartholomew were virtually
32
preponderant, it by no means limited its test to such facts.
"Indeed," Judge Medina noted, "cases such as Mproumeriotis v.
Seacrest Shipping Co. . . . and Argyros v. Polar Compania de
Navegacion . . . holding American ownership alone insufficient

to warrant application of the Jones Act must be considered of
doubtful validity. ' 33 While Bartholomew may not have been
binding appellate court precedent, it is reasonable to assume that
it would have provided direction to the lower courts. When this
case was read in conjunction with Bobolakis and Rodriguez, it
seemed clear that the trend now was to hold that way. But once
again, the logical result did not follow. In the eleven years between
Bartholomew and Groves, there have been only two cases in which
the courts have decided the substantiality of mere American
ownership.34 Both were district court cases, and both ignored the
admonition in Bartholomew by holding ownership alone
insufficient. 35 Thus, in applying the Groves facts to either
31. Id. at 440.
32. Id. at 440-41.
33. Id. at 443 n.4.
34. Moutzouris v. National Shipping & Trading Co., 194 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Mpampouris v. S.S. Auromar, 203 F. Supp. 944 (D. Md. 1962).
35. Both also distinguished away all opposition on the grounds that the opposing
cases involved facts in addition to bare American ownership. Zielinski also involved a
plaintiff who was a United States domiciliary. In Bobolakis, the contract was signed in
the United States. Bartholomew involved virtually preponderant contacts. And Rodriguez,
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Lauritzen's "balancing the contacts" test, or Bartholomew's

"substantial contacts" test, Judge Bryan's judicial guidance can
only be summed up as one eleven year old court of appeals
dictum, and six conflicting and sometimes illogical" district court
cases.
IV.

LOGIC, PRUDENCE, AND THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR

The basis for Judge Bryan's decision in Groves seems to be
merely a moral conclusion that American shipowners should not
escape American justice so easily.3 7 His conclusion is supported
only by a selective review of the cases which support him. The
others are ignored. Bartholomew is cited for the proposition that
the Jones Act has been regularly applied to American owned
vessels flying flags of convenience. He also relies on the comment
in Bartholomew as to the doubtful validity of cases holding bare
American ownership insufficient. He summarily concludes:
[T]he substantial contacts with the United States through
American ownership, control and operation from the United
States provide the 'heavy counterweight' necessary to
overcome the law of the flag, which
in this case is purely a flag
3
of convenience in the barest sense. 1
Rather than take this summary approach to what Judge
Bryan admits is a "recurrent and troublesome" problem, the
better approach in Groves would have been to do some original
reasoning and, acknowledging the major problems, to have
arrived at a solution that is legally, logically, and politically
prudent. The following are examples of problems which needed to
be considered in this case.
A.

Did Congress Intend for the Jones Act to Apply in Bare
Ownership Cases?
The Jones Act. extends its benefits and protections to "any
seaman. ' 39 A literal application of this, however, would be
so the two cases argue, alleged control in addition to ownership. It is only here, in
Rodriguez, that their argument fails. After distinguishing it from the "mere ownership"
cases on the ground that it also involved control, both cases rejected the Rodriguez

distinction between control and ownership. The sheer illogic of this inconsistency has
evidently been missed by the courts.
36. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
37. Civil no. 64-2005 (S.D.N.Y.) at 16.
38. Id. at 15.
39. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1965).

19701

COMMENT

preposterous. Yet Congress did not clarify the limits of the Acts
coverage. It is clearly a remedial statute, 4 and was intended to be
liberally construed.41 However, as Chief Justice Marshall said,
"An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
"42
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains ....
This leads to an inquiry of what the relevant law of nations is.
Justice Jackson, in Lauritzen, points to "the most venerable and
universal rule of maritime law. The law of the flag prevails unless
some heavy counterweight appears. ' 43 Lauritzen's discussion of
the seven factors is precisely designed to provide a definition of
that "heavy counterweight."
Since the -Jones Act is a remedial measure,4 4 its intent is to
provide a remedy for injured seamen, not to penalize negligent
shipowners. In the Groves case, it is the shipowner who is the
United States contact, not the seaman. The deceased was a British
subject, injured in Japanese waters. Plaintiff too was a British
subject with no American contacts. The United States has no duty
or interest in protecting either of them. So logically, if the Jones
Act is intended to provide a remedy for injuries to American
seamen, and there are no American interests served by protecting
this seaman, then there are no American interests to be served in
applying the Jones Act to this case. On the other hand, Liberia
does have legitimate interests to be served in asserting authority
over the case. She realizes a substantial part of her revenue from
registering ships. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas,4 5 art.
V (1) provides as to vessel registration, "There must exist a
genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the
State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical, and social matters over ships flying its
flag." So, to retain its right under international law to register
such ships, Liberia must assert its authority over such claims as
this. The courts will no doubt note that Liberian law, like United
States non-statutory general maritime law, provides no remedy
for wrongful death actions. This, however, is no reason for
40. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955).
41. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
42. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
43. 345 U.S. at 580.
44. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955).
45. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. V, opened for signature April 28, 1958,
13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82.
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American courts to substitute American legislative judgment for
Liberian legislative judgment. The temptation may be strong for
courts to apply the law of the nation providing the best remedy
for a plaintive plaintiff. But even a cursory reading of Lauritzen
and Bartholomew shows that this is not to be used as a
consideration. A direct application of Lauritzen indicates that
Liberia has by far the greater interest. Therefore, the law of the
flag should govern. The Jones Act cannot apply.
B.

Even if Jurisdiction Was Possible, Would it be Prudent to
Exercise It?

There are many cases in the field of international law where
the proper question is not how far can American authority reach,
but rather, how far should it be extended? When meeting in the
international arena, nations, theoretically, deal with each other as
equals. Where the de facto power of one nation can infringe on
the pride or financial resources of another, diplomacy, in the
interests of international peace and harmony, may require that
nation to restrain the use of its power.
For example when, as in Lauritzen, the case concerns a
traditional maritime nation like Denmark, with a well developed
system of maritime law, caution is indicated. Indiscriminate
substitution of United States maritime law for Danish law, in
cases where Denmark has a national interest, can easily become
an affront to their national pride. In such cases, except where "the
peace or dignity of the [United States] or the tranquility of the
port is threatened,"" diplomatic discretion would demand
deference to the foreign law.
When dealing with traditionally non-maritime nations, such
as Panama, Liberia, and Honduras, whose interest in such cases
is basically financial, caution is still required. These nations
understandably can become indignant at American incursions into
their revenue raising activities. For example, Panama, in response
to American authority exerted over Panamian flag ships," has
threatened to subject United States flag vessels in Panamanian
46. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. at 585, 586.
47. These threats arose in the context of American courts extending N.L.R.B.
jurisdiction over Panamanian flag vessels while they were in American ports. In
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), the
Supreme Court held N.L.R.B. jurisdiction could not reach foreign flag vessels. The

possibility of "international dischord" was cited as a major consideration.
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ports to equally inconvenient domestic rules concerning the
internal matters of ships,48 or to assert Panamanian sovereignty
over waters to twelve miles out, including waters near the canal
zone. 9 As Lauritzen points out, while international law probably
cannot achieve perfect uniformity, it must be "mindful of the
necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be
avoided ..
V.

CONCLUSION

This comment has examined seven district court cases 51 faced
with the specific issue of whether bare American beneficial
ownership of a foreign flag vessel will justify application of the
Jones Act. The decisions are .conflicting and to a large extent do
not reflect the sophisticated reasoning required -by the Lauritzen
and Bartholomew tests. A close examination of the problem and
the cases dealing with it leads to the following conclusion. An
amalgamation of the Lauritzen and Bartholomew tests would
provide the most complete and relevant approach to the issue.
This approach would begin by determining if the case presents
"substantial" American contacts. If it does, these contacts and
the interests of the United States which would be served by
exercising its authority should be balanced against foreign
contacts, and the interests to be served by the exercise of foreign
authority. If the United States' interests are greater, then to the
degree that it is internationally prudent, the Jones Act should
apply.
Applying this test to the facts in Groves v. Universe
Tankships, Inc.5" the following conclusions are reached: (1) it is
doubtful that the case presents "substantial" United States
contacts; (2) even if it did, the interests of Liberia in adjudicating
the claim are clearly greater than those of the United States; and
(3) considering the possibility of reprisals not only from Liberia,
but also from supporting African block nations and sympathetic
Panlibhon countries, the better part of valor would indicate
discreet abstention from jurisdiction.
MICHAEL
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48. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1961 at 44.
49. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1961 at 45.

50. 345 U.S. at 582.
51. All but one (Mpampouris) are from the same district: the Southern District of
New York.
52. Civil no. 64-2005 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 23, 1970).

